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The inadequacy of partial, sectoral analyses of
Britain's current development problems is in-
creasingly recognised. The approach of develop-
ment studiesto the extent that it deals with the
total social, political and economic context of any
particular sectoral problemis thus increasingly
attractive. Nonetheless, 'Britain as a developing
country' ought to be treated as a question, rather
than a statement or conclusion. This caution is
particularly important where the area of concern
is social welfare policy, persistent deprivation and
their manifestation in housing location and
housing allocation.
The theme is questionable at a number of levels.
First, Britain continues to benefit from very high
levels of past investment and fixed capital in
housing and infrastructure. Visitors from develop-
ing countries may be unwilling to extend much
sympathy to Britain's 'development' while British
public housing standards are unobtainable by
even middle-class applicants in their own coun-
tries. Second, the welfare state in Britain is well
established. Furthermore, British experience in
housing has been exported as a model to be
followed, or at least closely examined, by .Third
World housing sector policy-makers: it is not an
independent test-case.
Populist programmes for social and economic
change in newly independent African and Asian
countries have often put emphasis on the im-
provement of housing and housing services, par-
ticularly in the urban areas. Such popular housing
programmes have usually been difficult to imple-
ment and have seldom benefited those for whom
they usually were intended. Few developing
countries can finance extensive building pro-
grammes, or find the managerial and artisan
skills and administrative machinery to make them
possible. House construction is seldom attractive
to the private sector because of a low rate of
profit compared with hotel or office contruction.
Inevitably, few houses have been built, and these
have on the whole been allocated to government
officials and others with financial means and
political connections. Housing has become in the
popular imagination a wage-good for adminis-
trators and equivalent groups.
Thus the rate of production usually fails to keep
pace with population growth and rural-urban
migration. Policy-makers are all too aware of the
gap between the housing provided in the 'formal'
sector and their inability to provide even barely
adequate shelter for the urban masses. Yet at
the same time it is often argued, especially by
those concerned with rural development, that
too many resources are already allocated to the
cities: the further development of urban services
will only speed up rural-urban migration and
weaken the ability of the countryside to develop
itself.
These problems seem a far cry from British ex-
perience. Britain has developed a housing stock
which in aggregate seems adequate for its popu-
lation's needs. Its problems appear rather to be
those of market and administrative mis-allocation
and labour immobility. Yet concern about the
possible implications of housing for migration
and labour mobility is usually secondary to its
acceptance as an essential provision of the welfare
state. There is considerable variety at the local
level because of local political differences and
pressures, but on balance housing is normally
delivered on the basis of administratively-defined
social need rather than as an instrument of
regional policy and employment balance.
A comparision of the British and Third World
experience nevertheless has valualle lessons to
offer for both. This is particularly evident in the
making and implementation of policy related
to metropolitan growth. In many countries, in-
cluding the United States and much of the Third
World, megapolitan growth and concentration
seem relentless. Symposia are devoted to 'the
exploding cities'; and end of the century projec-
tions for cities like Calcutta, Manila, Mexico
City and Sao Paulo reckon populations in tens of
millions. There is, therefore, considerable interest
in the developing countries in efforts to decongest
large metropolitan centres such as London. The
Philippines, for example, has consciously based
some of its policies on British new towns; sub-
regional growth centres have been established in
central Luzon and the establishment of new, Pol-
luting industries within 50 km of the centre of
Manila has been banned in an attempt to slow
down metropolitan growth.
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The lessons, however, are not always positive.
Close examination of the British experience of
decongesting cities suggests that while the policy
has been implemented successfully in terms of
its original aims, equally formidable new prob-
lems have been created. Moreover, Britain's faith
in the neutrality and efficiency of its public service
has made it difficult to spot difficulties which
would be self-evident in developing countries,
where social service ideologies would be less likely
to obscure the contradictions between welfare
and production and employment, the operation of
class alignments and the dilemmas of state inter-
vention in urban development.
The post-war programme for 'decongesting'
London's population and industry was wholly
successful in its own terms. Between 1961 and
1974 the population of Greater London fell by
803,000 and over the same period the capital's
manufacturing employment declined by one third.
The promotion of new and expanding towns was
one expression of this policy and, again, much
can also be claimed in terms of their own via-
bility. Industry has been attracted to the new
towns to match the expansion of their population;
and they have become a profitable state enterprise
of which the Treasury is a net beneficiary.
Yet in terms of the changed criteria of regional
development policy they are now believed to have
been misdirected. The minister of housing who
was responsible for London in 1964 now says
that he was 'guilty' of taking wrong advice in
favour of a decentralisation which actually led
to the deterioration of conditions in London
(Mellish, 1977). In accordance with this view, the
Government has announced cuts in new town
population and expenditure targets in order to
channel investment back to the metropolitan
centres (House of Commons, 1977). The new town
policy which was to save the old cities by de-
congesting them is now to be sacrificed (or at least
restrained) for their revival.
The initial success and subsequent over-success
of decongestion is one way of analysing the situa-
tion. lt is doubtful, however, whether it tells us
much about the actual outcomes of policy. If
one begins on the other hand by scrutinising
these outcomes, it is easier to see how inner
London boroughs have been caught in a perverse
set of relationships and networks centred around
the provision of employment and housing.
For it was inner London which benefited (or,
with hindsight we might say suffered) most from
the reduction in population and the loss of
industry. However, the decline in employment
and population has had none of the favourable
50
Population decline in London
fall
1951 1961 % 1971
Outer
London 4,515,255 4,499,564 0.3 4,399,316 2.2
Inner
London 3,681,552 3,492,879 5.1 2,979,698 14.7
Source: 1971 Census Office of Population and
Census Statistics
effects that 'decongestion' was supposed to bring.
The people leaving the inner city have been the
younger and the more skilled who were selected
for housing and jobs in the new and expanding
town and suburbs. Meanwhile, the Inner London
boroughs' own post-war commitment to a large
scale house-building programme, operated on the
basis of family need, has reduced the mobility of
a population which finds it increasingly difficult to
find work in London. While manufacturing has de-
clined, London's administrative and service
functions have expanded, but these offer fewer
jobs to the semi and unskilled workers who are
concentrated in the inner city, most of whom are
in relatively unstable and badly paid employment.
The growth of this sector of employment has had
two other polarising effects. First office and hotel
development has contributed to high speculative
land prices which have made it more difficult for
poorer people to move out of the poorer
boroughs. And second it has progressively
concentrated the business component of London's
tax (rates) base in the core City area.
The fulfillment of public housing obligations
commits local authorities to heavy social service
expenditures on a relatively needy and immobile
population. But office development, extending the
City of London's functions into surrounding
boroughs, is the only way of expanding employ-
ment and gaining revenue in order to finance
social services and housing. The dilemma is that
this is precisely the development least suited to
the population's employment needs. It may even
increase the demand for public housing by en-
couraging the demolition of cheap private rented
accommodation as well as by destroying those
small businesses which remain. But the alternative
of promoting manufacturing employment is
scarcely available, not only because costs and
incentives have removed it from inner city areas
but also because other aspects of decentralisation
policy stand in the way. Until the recent policy
changes, inner London boroughs have been for-
bidden by central government from advertising
for industrial expansion, and even existing manu-
facturing companies have found it difficult to
obtain government permission (industrial develop-
ment certificates) to expand.
fall
0//0
The population of central London finds itself
trapped in these contradictions: those least suited
to the new employment opportunities are most
likely to qualify for public housing; those wishing
to move are held in the inner city by the un-
transferability of council house eligibility rights
and the financial exclusiveness of the private
housing market.
The attempt to reorder priorities in order to
bring about the flow of resources from new towns
to the inner cities assumes not only that existing
policy instruments are broadly correct, although
needing redirection, but also that policies are in
fact reversible. Major changes do not occur just
because new policies are formulated. The firms
(and people) that were removed from central city
areas by planning policies, costs, and the
infrastructural and investment attractions pro-
vided in alternative areas, cannot easily be
brought back. They may have good reasons for
staying where they are with relatively lower costs
and improved services. Interests become en-
trenched as new structures (not least governmental)
establish themselves. The dynamism of well-estab-
lished policies was illustrated, the day before the
Government's announcement of its change in
priorities, by Crawley New Town's call for further
government investment in the town's housing to
help satisfy its industries' needs for skilled labour,
since the alternative was to continue to import
labour daily from London.
Even if we asume that government can in fact
successfully reorder its priorities, questions remain
about the future flow of investment. In a period
of low growth is there in fact any development to
share out? Is there any reason to assume that the
investment will revert to the old cities in the
absence of government compulsion? Policy-
makers tend to assume that if a formal structure
(of local, regional or central government or a new
partnership between them) exists to coordinate
services and plan economic strategy, then co-
ordination and strategic development happen.
The experience of the Greater London Council,
established in 1963 as the first metropolitan
strategic planning authority, is hardly en-
couraging. Its planning is ineffective in the
absence of executive authority and tends to break
down as soon as the separate interests of boroughs
are exposed. Its house-building programme has
usually been forced back in to inner London by
the reluctance of outer suburban boroughs to
accept increases in population which might in-
crease their social service obligations and ad-
.versely affect property values. The possibility of
radical and irremovable conflict can seldom be
seriously discussed since any 'conflict' is decreed
to be about limited 'issues'such as the trans-
ferability of particular, individual eligibilities for
public housingand not about the possible per-
versities of the system. If the productive structure
of British society is not in question then a range
of particular blockages may escape notice: the
response to continuiiig deprivation may be an
uncritical call for more and better services. If
incomes are falling and alternative options re-
ceding, government activities are more readily
seen to be ineffective, awkward or even perverse.
The perversity is precisely that in the real world
of housing and employment outcomes, public
sector interventions tend to redistribute problems
of deprivation and poverty, both geographically
and socially: they rarely eradicate them.
Indeed, the admirable and often envied concern
with social welfare and distribution in British
housing policy may be a weakness. The complex
structural patterning of welfare outcomes is ob-
scured by the fact that policy-implementing in-
stitutions constantly reiterate a narrow sectoral
definition of their function. Moreover in the close
relationship between policy and research, pre-
scription and analysis become easily confused.
Social policy research tends to remain caught up
in and often dominated by the language and
activities of the sponsoring agencies and depart-
ments. 'Slum clearance', 'inner city development',
'public health', 'housing', etc. become convenient
foci of research, diverting attention from the re-
lationships between the structures of distribution
and of production and their impact on the wel-
fare and life-chances of actual households. Even
the tradition of local and community study in
British social science which has always maintained
its own independent perspective on social prob-
lems has succumbed to the sectoral approach to
the extent that it has concentrated on issues of
local community relations and conflict rather
than the macro-structural context in which they
are determined by policy-makers. The recent
interest in Marxist analyses of urban development
in Britain is often only a reaction to the limita-
tions of the sectoral approach, rather than being
immediately concerned with the language and
perspective of the policy-maker and his response
to the political-economic context in which he
implements policy.
The belief that the problem of 'urban deprivation'
is an aberration and soluble by ad hoc interven-
tions is, then, a reflection of the sectoral nature
of most British social research and policy-making.
Problems are perceived as isolated 'social welfare'
phenomena rather than as systemically related
political-economic relations. This is in spite of the
fact that governments have chased the problem
full circle and found that every sort of solution
seems to do little more than pick up some of the
pieces left by the previous one. Policies for the
removal of population and industry from major
cities give way to policies for their return; pro-
grammes for the physical improvement of urban
housing provoke the eviction of poorer tenants;
improvements in the security of private tenants
contribute to the worsening of the housing pros-
pects of the homeless; high rise council housing,
a solution 10 years ago, is now a problem for
both tenants and housing managers; legislation
to acquire for the community the betterment value
of land is thwarted by a lack of finance to acquire
land and the reluctance of owners to sell.
Yet each failure in welfare and policy terms
appears to reinforce the search for solutions which
are as contained, sectoral and ad hoc as those
they follow. Failure may suggest that new
agencies, ministries or departments are n«eded;
that proper coordination is absent; that new
research methodologies could produce the material
essential for consistent planning; or that a new
kind of administrative expertise is needed. These
solutions and adjustments to failure rarely chal-
lenge the institutionally acceptable rationale for
administrative activity.
Calling for new commitments and a new evangel-
ism among politicians and administrators is
scarcely more effective than calling for new
departments. The inevitable ambiguities of policy
based, for example, on themes of 'equality of
opportunity' are unlikely to be removed by more
exacting personal commitments or calls for 'parity
of esteem'. Even to emphasise the citizen's politi-
cal choices or the possibility of client advocacy
and participation, is still to look for an administra-
tively convenient solution. When client groups
are sponsored by welfare administrations they
rapidly lose their authenticity as grass-roots move-
ments. They tend to collapse when the specific
issues they are organised to attack are either
attained or blocked, or when the administration
weakens in its support by removing key liaison
officials (Rein, 1969).
All these responses to persistent urban depriva-
tion reflect that welfare monism which frames so
much of policy and policy diagnosis. Failures in
a programme are either diagnosed wholly within
the conventional framework of institutional re-
form or by creating and thrusting into prominence
a weakness such as 'poor coordination' to avoid
facing the real contradictions between welfare and
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production aims which extend over wide areas
of policy and activity.
In the face of the inadequacy of its sectoral
policies, government has resorted, since 1968, to
a ceaseless round of small-scale special projects
designed to demonstrate the power of coordinated
(that is cross service) action which is never, how-
ever, countenaced on a grand scale and which is
always applied locally rather than to central
government. The research associated with com-
munity development projects, inner area studies,
the urban aid programme, neighbourhood schemes
and comprehensive community programmes has
consistently concluded, however, that the prob-
lems of the inner cities are neither localised, nor
pathological, nor amenable to even the most co-
ordinated treatment by the social services, but
are integral to much more fundamental struc-
tures of inequality. This is not so much a question
of limited policy ambitions as a failure to res-
pond with imagination to the outcomes of policy.
Current government statements about the prob-
lems of the inner city areas, for example, can
hardly be faulted for the breadth of their des-
cription:
"The old problem of poor housingand in
some areas, congestionhave still to be over-
come, but in many areas they have been joined
by new problems of high unemployment, decay
and dereliction, unbalanced population struc-
ture, with disproportionate numbers of the
disadvantaged and the elderly, and an accom-
panying loss of internal morale and external
confidence" (House of Commons, 1 977A).
However, except that legislation is promised to
"enhance the powers of local authoritiesto
enable them to assist industry and designate
industrial improvement areas", the action that
is proposed remains selective, cheap, small-scale
and local. 'Partnerships' are to be formed between
central government departments and a very few
selected local authorities to develop 'coordinated'
action (sharing between them a budget of £lOOm).
On past experience, we might question whether
such ad hoc groupings are capable of imposing
a global view on agencies with separate interests,
structures, and orientations.
We must continue to wonder, therefore, if the
often perverse welfare and employment implica-
tions of rural-urban movement and resource ex-
traction and allocation which are so characteristic
of Third World countries have been ever seriously
considered for their possible implications for
Britain. Such processes drain the rural areas of
resources and leave behind the needy: are the
flows of resources to the new towns and the diffi-
culties faced by inner London boroughs so very
different? Similarly, if the customary faith in the
overall rationality of a welfare bureaucracy's
implementation is questionedas it usually is in
developing countrieswould this bring into
cfuestion the current language and ambitions of
the policy-maker, and lead to a more creative
response to policy failures? A world of known
perversities and contradictions is certainly un-
settling and tentative. But for developing coun-
tries it constitutes the everyday world of urban
development policy.
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